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In a secular, multicultural, liberal democratic 
society founded on the rule of law,1 is it appro-
priate for legislators (or political candidates) to 
refer to religious beliefs or texts when discuss-
ing a government initiative or urging action 
on a particular issue? Such references might be 
used for various purposes: to explain the speak-
ers’ own beliefs; to emphasize that an issue 
has been around for a long time and therefore 
should be taken seriously; to elucidate historical 
influences on a particular law; or to give weight 
to a particular argument by buttressing it with 
religious authority. In Canada today, do ethics, 
law, or political theory offer persuasive reasons 
to limit any such references to religion in parlia-
mentary debate or political campaigning?
In previous articles, we considered the 
role of religious-based reasoning in two other 
spheres: public discussion2 and judicial decision 
making.3 In the first, we argued that there is no 
valid reason to dissuade citizens from referring 
to their religious beliefs when discussing matters 
of public interest. In the second article, we sug-
gested that using religious-based reasoning as a 
starting point for judicial analysis is acceptable 
where the law is underdetermined,4 and where 
care is taken not to violate constitutional pro-
tection for freedom of religion, which requires 
that the state be neutral as between different 
faiths and between believers and nonbelievers. 
We turn now to legislators. We do so not 
because we predict any great surge in religious 
references and religious-based arguments in 
Parliament, provincial or territorial legislatures, 
municipal councils, or election campaigning, but 
because the issue gives a third angle from which 
to consider the relationship between religion 
and the public sphere in Canada. Canadian 
scholar Benjamin Berger suggests that “[t]here 
is perhaps no more important access point into 
the key issues of m odern political thought and 
legal theory than the questions raised by the 
interaction of law and religion in contemporary 
constitutional democracies.”5 
In our first article in this series we focused 
on philosophical arguments about what is or is 
not appropriate behaviour for citizens debating 
in the public square. In our article on the use of 
religious-based reasoning by judges, we looked 
primarily at legal arguments regarding freedom 
of religion, the role of judges, and the rule of 
law. Our primary focus in this third article is 
on political theory and, in particular, on differ-
ent understandings of a constellation of related 
concepts: state neutrality, separation of church 
and state, and, particularly, secularism. 
We start our discussion with a brief over-
view of the ways in which Canadian politicians 
have relied on religious-based reasoning. We 
then examine whether ethical considerations, 
freedom of religion, or arguments arising from 
political theory should preclude Canadian 
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legislators or political candidates from mak-
ing reference to religious beliefs or texts. We 
conclude that, so long as freedom of religion 
is not infringed, a secular, multicultural, lib-
eral democratic state founded on the rule of law 
should provide room for legislators or political 
candidates to explain their position on public 
issues in terms of their religious beliefs, or with 
reference to religious texts or authority, if they 
choose to do so.
Of course, this does not mean that such 
explanations or references will always be good 
political strategy. Very general statements, such 
as vague allusions to love, sin, or God’s will may 
not be seen as having enough substance to move 
the discussion along, while specific faith-based 
claims may be seen as unprovable and thus un-
persuasive. In fact, explaining one’s political 
views in religious terms may simply call forth 
incredulity, irritation, or even hostility in oth-
ers, or may make it more difficult to form al-
liances with those of another (or no) religious 
perspective. 
Further, we are not suggesting that recourse 
to religious arguments or texts by legislators 
will necessarily lead to a better society: religious 
reasons (like nonreligious ones) can be used to 
support mean-spirited and retrogressive gov-
ernment policies, as well as enlightened and 
compassionate ones.6 In our view, however, any 
policy should be judged on its own merits, in 
other words, on how it will affect individuals, 
communities, and different sectors of society, 
rather than by whether some of those advocat-
ing for or against it refer to religion.
Finally, just as we do not claim that reli-
gious references will necessarily advance a par-
ticular political cause, or lead to policies that 
are good for society, nor do we think that refer-
ences to religion in political speech will always 
be good for religion. Relying on religious rea-
sons to buttress draconian or ungenerous poli-
cies may confirm for some that all religions (or 
the particular religion being relied upon in that 
case) are hypocritical in their talk of compas-
sion and justice. Hearing politicians on both 
sides of a debate claim that their position is bib-
lically based may lead some to conclude that re-
ligious reasoning is silly or chaotic, or may call 
to mind Shakespeare’s comment that even the 
Devil can cite scripture to his purpose.7 Ameri-
can scholar Stephen Carter—who has roundly 
criticized efforts to excise “God-talk” from the 
public square—warns that constantly invoking 
religion in political debate may cause “God’s 
name [to] become a tool, a trope, a ticket to get 
us where we want to go.”8
So we are not asking whether religious-
based arguments or references will necessarily 
further a particular policy objective or politi-
cian’s career, lead to better governance, or en-
hance society’s view of religion; we are simply 
asking whether there is room for such argu-
ments and references in a secular, multicultural, 
liberal democratic society such as Canada. Or, 
to put it another way: are the core principles of 
democracy, as understood in Canada, violated 
by legislators making religious-based argu-
ments and references?
Political References to Religion
Religious references by politicians in the 
United States are not unusual.9 To give two 
recent examples, President Barack Obama has 
buttressed his call for higher taxes for the rich 
by reference to Luke 12:48,10 while Republican 
Rick Santorum has alleged that Obama’s 
policies are not biblically based.11 In Canada, 
however, it is fairly rare for politicians to 
support their positions on social or economic 
policy by reference to their religious beliefs or 
by calling on religious authority. This may, of 
course, simply reflect different political realities 
in the two countries. Thus, according to political 
scientist Katherine Fierlbeck, 
Only 30 per cent of Canadians consider them-
selves to be devout, so policy-makers heed their 
political constituencies rather than religious 
authorities when legislating new laws and 
programs. This secularism makes Canada dis-
tinct from the United States; over two-thirds 
of Americans consider themselves to be regu-
lar church-goers, and American politicians are 
very mindful of religious lobby groups.12
That said, other researchers report significant 
levels of “religiosity” in Canada,13 and certainly 
religious-based organizations and coalitions 
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have lobbied government on a variety of 
issues over the years. Whatever the degree of 
religious adherence or affiliation in Canada, 
however, it does appear that overt references 
to religion by individual politicians or overt 
reliance on religion by political parties is fairly 
rare in Canada. The Social Credit Party and 
the Canadian Co-operative Federation (CCF) 
are often seen as “good examples of 20th 
century religious-political movements.”14 Today, 
however, the Social Credit Party has little or 
no impact on politics. As for the CCF, even the 
early connections to religion may be somewhat 
more nuanced than sometimes assumed: J. S. 
Woodsworth ultimately came to believe that 
the formal religious institutions to which he 
belonged were at odds with his political goals,15 
and Tommy Douglas remarked that the Bible 
was like a fiddle that could play whatever tune 
the fiddler wanted.16 Certainly, today the New 
Democratic Party (NDP), the successor to the 
CCF, has “shed most of its Christian identity.”17 
In fact, one commentator suggests that “[i]t is 
more likely that political influence has had a 
larger impact on the doctrine of the United 
Church than religious doctrine has shaped the 
New Democratic Party.”18
While contemporary Canadian politicians 
do not frequently make arguments based on 
religious belief, or turn to religious authority 
to give weight to their position, it is possible to 
find a few such examples. For instance, in a ser-
mon, Elizabeth May, who is both the leader of 
the federal Green Party and an Anglican priest 
in training, connected her environmentalist 
concerns to her religious beliefs.19 A number 
of parliamentarians have expressed their reli-
giously based opposition to embryonic stem cell 
research, referring, variously, to the belief that 
ensoulment occurs at the moment of concep-
tion,20 to Jesus’ teachings on the need to protect 
children,21 and to “the very principles of natu-
ral law [which] existed before government and 
. . . [which] are based on the law of nature and 
nature’s God.”22 Other examples include refer-
ences to injunctions against usury in the Bible 
and the Quran in a discussion on credit card 
interest;23 an allusion to Deuteronomy 24:10 in 
a list of arguments for greater privacy in one’s 
home;24 reference to the biblical concept of Jubi-
lee to advocate forgiving debts owed by poorer 
nations;25 reliance on the Bible and the Quran 
in support of amending the Criminal Code to 
create a specific offence for suicide bombings;26 
and a request to reinstate the Lord’s Prayer in 
the House of Commons.27
The paucity of overt references to religion 
by Canadian legislators does not, of course, 
mean that no Canadian politicians are reli-
gious; on occasion, members of the clergy have 
been elected to government and some other leg-
islators have held strong religious beliefs as well. 
For instance, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau 
was a committed Roman Catholic and one 
analysis of his “universalist liberalism” devotes 
significant discussion to “the spiritual sources 
of Trudeau’s political philosophy.”28 However, 
Trudeau rarely made the connection between 
his political views and his religion explicit, at 
least in public. Like Trudeau, most Canadian 
politicians of faith have kept that faith a private 
matter. This suggests that there is a strong social 
norm against express reliance by legislators on 
religious-based reasoning. According to Claude 
Ryan, “There has been a tendency since World 
War II to relegate religion to the private sphere; 
to suggest that it should have as little as possible 
to do with economic, social and political life.”29
In the remainder of this paper, we evalu-
ate the arguments that are frequently invoked 
in support of upholding or even strengthening 
this norm—arguments based on ethical consid-
erations, the Charter, and political theory. We 
conclude that concerns about civility and inclu-
siveness, the Constitution, or the secular nature 
of Canada do not justify attempting to place an 
embargo on legislators referencing religion.
Ethical Considerations: Civility and 
Inclusiveness
Can an ethical argument against the use of re-
ligious references by legislators be constructed, 
based on civility and inclusiveness? Arguably, 
one of the core elements of “liberal-democratic 
morality” is “freedom[] of political communi-
cation.”30 If so, careful thought should be given 
to whether particular ways of communicating 
about important political and social issues im-
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pede others (particularly those who have been 
historically marginalized) from entering into 
the discussion. Would religious references by 
politicians so ostracize those who do not share 
their religious views that reliance on such refer-
ences could be seen as unethical or offending 
liberal-democratic morality?
In a state where a vast majority of citizens 
are at least nominally of one religion, one might 
assume that most religious references will re-
late to that religion. Thus, in Canada, where 
three-quarters of Canadians self-identify as 
Christian,31 it is possible that most religious 
reasoning would be based on the Bible and par-
ticularly, perhaps, the New Testament, or on 
Christian perspectives on the Bible. Could it be 
argued that anyone not familiar with both Old 
and New Testaments and with Christian tradi-
tion would have to become familiar in order 
to enter the debate? If so, could this be seen as 
inappropriate and unwelcoming in a multicul-
tural, secular society? 
We offer three responses: first, it is impor-
tant to answer questions such as this in context, 
rather than as hypotheticals; second, an under-
standing of civility as avoiding all possibility of 
disagreement would weaken public and politi-
cal debate; and finally, inclusiveness actually de-
mands that politicians feel free to refer to their 
comprehensive values, whether religious or not.
Looking first at context, then: the concern 
that religious-based reasoning could work to 
exclude those of another, or no, religion would 
be more pressing if all citizens of the dominant 
religion were both so devout and so theologically 
knowledgeable that religious-based reasoning 
was in wide usage, or if law and religion were 
so closely intertwined that it would be hard to 
understand the law without understanding the 
dominant faith. We could imagine a society 
where the inability to quote passages from 
a particular religious text might leave one 
completely outside mainstream political debate 
or unable to understand the law. That is not the 
situation in Canada, however. If an argument 
from religion strikes listeners in Canada today 
as incomprehensible, it is the speaker, not the 
listener, who is likely to be sidelined.32 Further, 
if the concern is that mainstream Christians 
would benefit most from a political atmosphere 
that is open to religious references, this is not 
necessarily the case. While more Canadians 
consider themselves as affiliated with a Christian 
denomination than any other religion, it does 
not necessarily follow that political references to 
religion would be overwhelmingly mainstream 
Christian. It seems possible that there are 
other communities in Canada—for instance, 
although not limited to, those who have 
recently immigrated—where religion may play 
a more significant role in one’s sense of identity. 
Individuals from these communities might feel 
a greater need to express their concerns and 
priorities in religious terms. If so, a norm that 
frowns on the use of religious-based reasoning 
by legislators is far from inclusive; it may, albeit 
unintentionally, discourage some Canadians, 
including some newer Canadians, from entering 
politics.
Secondly, while civility—treating others’ 
views with respect—is of utmost importance, it 
should not be watered down to mean avoidance 
of disagreement or diverse views. Divisiveness 
alone is not a valid criterion for excluding ideas 
from political speech. Presumably, we want to 
foster a vigorous debate on matters of public 
significance. As John Young argues,
To suggest that religion ought not to be part 
of public discussion and debate or influence 
public policy is to diminish democracy—not 
because the Bible or the Koran are superior 
political texts, but because democracy is, at its 
core, a debate.33
The mere fact that an idea may be unconven-
tional, startling, unpopular, or countercultural 
is no reason to muzzle the expression of such 
an idea. Religious-based reasoning by legisla-
tors, even if it falls oddly on some ears, may add 
richness and new and helpful perspectives; and 
frankly, even if it does not, it is still a valid form 
of expression. Further, debate that is not only 
vigorous but reveals why a person feels the way 
they do is more transparent and may allow for 
a more focussed examination and perhaps, ulti-
mately, rebuttal of certain ideas.34
This leads to our third point: politicians 
of faith should not be precluded from arguing 
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from their deepest convictions when there is no 
such restriction on others who wish to speak 
from deeply held positions. Thus, if a Canadian 
politician shared the view of American philoso-
pher Nicholas Wolterstorff that he personally 
can find no way of justifying why individuals 
and society should be concerned about alleviat-
ing poverty without turning to the Bible,35 sure-
ly it should be open to that politician to explain 
the religious foundation for his or her commit-
ment to social justice, just as it would be open to 
some other politician to express similar views 
based on deeply held humanist principles. 
Of course, the corollary of legislators using 
religious-based arguments is that the argument 
and the underlying faith claim are then as le-
gitimately open to critique, rebuttal, and satire 
as arguments offered from other perspectives. 
In other words, arguments based on religion—
like any other expression of belief, conscience, 
or opinion—can hope to be treated with re-
spect, but cannot expect to be treated as sacred 
in public debate. Such debate may at times be 
divisive (although other times may perhaps al-
low for greater understanding or even recon-
ciliation); however, wherever people hold strong 
conflicting views on important issues, there is 
the potential for discord. This would be the case 
whether or not explicitly religious-based argu-
ments are made. Thus, to use an American ex-
ample, in the last presidential election, Demo-
crats and Republicans were significantly at odds 
over whether the rich should be taxed more rig-
orously, and at least some politicians expressed 
this disagreement with rancour and personal 
attack, whether or not religion was referenced.
Arguably, then, excising religious 
references from politics is unlikely to create an 
atmosphere of harmony and accord. Further, 
only very watered-down notions of civility 
and inclusiveness, which might well result 
in watered-down public debate, could justify 
limiting politicians’ ability to explain their 
positions in religious terms, should they wish to 
do so.
Freedom of Religion
Would the constitutional protection for free-
dom of religion, which also protects freedom 
from religion,36 be violated by a legislator’s reli-
ance on religious-based reasoning? Section 2(a) 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
guarantees everyone the right to freedom of 
conscience and religion. As with all the rights 
and freedoms in the Charter, s. 2(a) places limits 
on the power of the state: the state is expected to 
be neutral as between religions and as between 
religious belief and unbelief.37 Further, s. 1 pro-
vides that such freedom is subject only to such 
limitations as can be demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society.38 
Freedom of religion encompasses several core 
concepts:
Freedom of religion consists first of all in the 
right to make up one’s own mind when an-
swering religious questions. These include, but 
are not limited to, such questions as whether 
God exists, how God should be conceived, and 
what responsibilities, if any, human beings 
have in response to God’s actions with regard 
to them. Freedom of religion also consists in 
the right to act in ways that seem appropriate, 
given one’s answers to religious questions—
provided that one does not cause harm to oth-
er people or interfere with their rights.39
A law might prove to be unconstitutional for its 
violation of these rights in two ways. First, leg-
islation that has a religious purpose is uncon-
stitutional—it infringes freedom of religion and 
cannot be saved by s. 1 of the Charter. Secondly, 
even where legislation is passed for a secular 
purpose, its impact may violate freedom of re-
ligion and this, too, is unconstitutional, unless 
the disproportionate impact can be justified un-
der s. 1. We argue that reference to religious rea-
soning by politicians does not, by itself, offend 
the Constitution in either respect.
Whether a law has an objectively religious 
purpose is discerned primarily from the lan-
guage of the act, including the act’s purpose 
section (if it has one), as well as from statements 
made by the government on a bill’s introduc-
tion, and from the purpose ascribed by earlier 
courts to similar legislation. Thus, in R. v. Big 
M Drug Mart,40 the Supreme Court of Canada 
concluded that the Lord’s Day Act41 (which re-
quired Sunday closing of businesses) had a reli-
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gious purpose. The Court reached this conclu-
sion by considering precursors to the legislation 
that contained overtly religious statements, and 
earlier decisions of the Privy Council and Su-
preme Court of Canada to the effect that the 
chief purpose of the legislation was to enforce 
observance of a Christian Sabbath and “provide 
for the peace and order of the public on the Lord’s 
Day.”42 According to Dickson J.: 
In proclaiming the standards of the Chris-
tian faith, the Act creates a climate hostile to, 
and gives the appearance of discrimination 
against, nonChristian Canadians. It takes reli-
gious values rooted in Christian morality and, 
using the force of the state, translates them 
into a positive law binding on believers and 
nonbelievers alike. The theological content of 
the legislation remains as a subtle and constant 
reminder to religious minorities within the 
country of their differences with, and alien-
ation from, the dominant religious culture.43
Once the Court in Big M concluded that the 
paramount purpose of the Lord’s Day Act was 
religious, that settled the constitutional ques-
tion. The purpose of the Act violated freedom 
of religion and so the legislation could not be 
saved by s. 1. 
The mere fact that legislators might offer 
faith-based justifications in support of a bill, or 
that legislation might cohere with the teachings 
of some religions does not, however, approach 
the threshold of an unconstitutionally imper-
missible religious purpose. Big M sets a high 
bar for finding that a law has a religious purpose 
such that it automatically offends the Constitu-
tion. This is appropriate, given that no recourse 
to s. 1 is available once the Big M test has been 
met. The “religious purpose” test will strike 
down laws that are so clearly infused with reli-
gious purpose that there is no need to consider 
their impact, and no justification is possible. 
Violations of freedom of religion on this 
first basis will be relatively rare in Canada 
and should not be found lightly. It would be a 
misunderstanding of the purpose of freedom 
of religion for a court to strike down a law as 
unconstitutional simply because the law co-
incides with the religious convictions of some 
politicians. This is particularly true since the 
religious purpose test is not the only protec-
tion offered by s. 2(a); courts have a second and 
more substantial basis on which to determine 
the constitutionality of a law, namely its impact. 
According to the Supreme Court of Canada 
in R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd.,44 a law 
whose purpose is secular may still be found 
to violate freedom of religion if its impact is 
not neutral as between religions or as between 
religion and nonreligion. If there is a prima facie 
violation of s. 2, then a s. 1 analysis is required. 
On the surface, Edwards Books looked similar 
to Big M as it, too, dealt with Sunday closing 
legislation; here, however, it was the Court’s s. 1 
analysis that proved decisive. In Edwards Books, 
the Court concluded that the Retail Business 
Holidays Act,45 unlike the Lord’s Day Act, was 
enacted for the secular purpose of providing a 
common day of rest for workers, rather than as 
a “surreptitious attempt to encourage religious 
worship.” 46 
The disproportionate impact on those 
whose religion observed a day of rest other 
than Sunday was an effect of the legislation, but 
not its purpose. Therefore, a s. 1 analysis could 
be conducted. In that case, the legislation was 
upheld.
An example may help to illustrate that use 
of religious-based reasoning by legislators is not 
enough, by itself, to infringe freedom of religion. 
Suppose a bill was introduced in Parliament to 
reintroduce the death penalty for first-degree 
murder. On the first basis for unconstitutional-
ity—a religious purpose – the bill would indeed 
be unconstitutional if it were introduced by the 
Minister of Justice as codifying the sixth com-
mandment or if this formed the purpose sec-
tion of the bill. Assume instead, however, that 
the bill is introduced as part of the government’s 
“get tough on crime” stance, and justified by the 
Minister of Justice as providing greater gen-
eral and specific deterrence and protecting the 
public. It would be quite possible for individual 
politicians to construct biblical arguments for 
the bill, for instance arguing that the deliber-
ate breaking of the commandment “Thou shalt 
not kill” 47 requires the most extreme penalty. 
These arguments would not, however, affect the 
purpose of the bill. Based on the approach tak-
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en in Big M and Edwards Books, it is extremely 
unlikely that a statement of religious conviction 
by one or more politicians in parliamentary 
debate would be sufficient to show that the law 
had a religious purpose or was a “surreptitious 
attempt to encourage religious worship.” Nor 
would it have the effect of imposing Abrahamic 
law on nonbelievers or create a climate hostile 
to nonbelievers. The secular nature of the bill 
would not be undermined simply because some 
individual MPs based their support of it on 
their religious beliefs. If the bill became law, it 
could not be challenged as having a religious—
and therefore unconstitutional—purpose. 
Therefore, to continue with our example, re-
instatement of the death penalty could be chal-
lenged on freedom of religion grounds only by 
showing that it had the effect of infringing free-
dom of religion. For this second potential basis 
of unconstitutionality, the presence or absence 
of religious reasoning by legislators would be 
completely irrelevant. A challenge based on dis-
parate impact would involve showing that rein-
stating the death penalty, although not directed 
at religious belief or practice, in fact prevented 
religious individuals from practicing their re-
ligion or imposed particular religious beliefs 
and practices on individuals. Such an argument 
might be made out if a prison official or other 
state employee objected on religious grounds to 
being compelled to assist with an execution. The 
success of such a challenge would have nothing 
to do, however, with whether religious or only 
secular justifications had been offered by indi-
vidual MPs during passage of the bill.
Thus, while constitutional parameters 
guard against legislation or government policy 
that has a religious purpose or that inadver-
tently infringes religious freedom (unless the 
infringement can be justified under s. 1 of the 
Charter), use of religious-based reasoning by 
legislators is not inherently unconstitutional.
Secularism and Related Concepts
Assuming that the constitutional limits estab-
lished by s. 2(a) of the Charter are adhered to, 
arguments against religious references by poli-
ticians flow less from the law and more from 
several related strands of political theory—most 
particularly from concepts of state neutrality, 
separation of church and state, and, above all, 
secularism. Each of these is a contested term, 
and we argue that only the most extreme inter-
pretation of each—interpretations not in keep-
ing with Canadian tradition—requires that re-
ligion be kept entirely out of public and political 
life. 
Neutrality
As noted above, the freedom of religion guar-
antee in s. 2(a) of the Charter has been inter-
preted as requiring that the state remain neutral 
as between religions and between religion and 
nonreligion. Not surprisingly, however, there 
are different notions as to how this neutrality 
is to be achieved—beyond the obvious constitu-
tional parameters discussed above that preclude 
the state from legislating for a religious purpose 
and require the state to provide justifications 
for legislation that has a disproportionate ef-
fect vis-à-vis religion. In the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s most recent decision involving free-
dom of religion, S.L. v. Commission scholaire 
des Chênes, Justice Deschamps, writing for the 
majority, states that “[r]eligious neutrality is 
now seen by many Western states as a legitimate 
means of creating a free space in which citizens 
of various beliefs can exercise their individual 
rights.”48 It is unclear, however, (and unneces-
sary to clarify for the purposes of that deci-
sion) whether the public space becomes “free” 
in this way by discouraging or encouraging a 
full discussion of the various beliefs held by 
citizens. In their report on interculturalism in 
Quebec, Building the Future: A Time for Recon-
ciliation,49 Gérard Bouchard and Charles Tay-
lor refer to the “ambiguity of state neutrality.”50 
They state that “it is widely acknowledged that 
the secular State must be neutral in respect of 
all religions. To this we must add that the State 
must not take sides as regards religion and non-
religion.”51 However, Bouchard and Taylor note 
that this neutrality may be expressed in differ-
ent “institutional structures.”52 They describe 
two possible structures: a complete separation 
of church and state and “the neutrality of the 
State with respect to religions and deep-seated 
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secular convictions.”53 They conclude that “[s]
ince freedom of conscience and religion is one 
of the purposes of secularism . . . the neutrality 
of the State . . . should be designed to foster, not 
hinder, its expression.”54 We would agree with 
their conclusion that neutrality is best achieved 
where free expression of matters of importance 
to individuals and communities, including mat-
ters relating to religious belief and conscience, is 
allowed to flourish.
Separation of Church and State
A core legacy of the Enlightenment is the idea 
that the church and state are not—and should 
not be—one. While this principle would be 
seen by most as a fundamental characteristic of 
modern Western democratic states, there are, 
however, a variety of ways in which this prin-
ciple can be understood. 
The formal separation of church and state 
is a key constitutional principle in the United 
States and has had a significant influence on 
how American courts have interpreted the 
clauses relating to religion in the US Constitu-
tion. In Canada, however, the status of separa-
tion of church and state arguments is less clear. 
Certainly, the Enlightenment legacy is evident 
in that there is no tradition in Canada of a theo-
cratic state intended to be ruled by god, where 
religious authorities are formally recognized as 
having the power to dictate law and policies. 
Further, Canada has no formal policy of requir-
ing an individual to belong to a particular faith 
in order to run for government or hold public 
office. Finally, unlike England, Canada has no 
tradition of an established church. In fact, given 
s. 2(a) of the Charter, attempts to inaugurate a 
theocracy, to require public officials to belong 
to a particular (or any) religion, or to create an 
established church would clearly be unconstitu-
tional. Beyond our political traditions and the 
requirements of s. 2(a) of the Charter, however, 
there is no exact sense of what further, if any-
thing, separation of church and state demands. 
The phrase is rarely used in Canadian ju-
risprudence, and one historian has character-
ized the relationship between church and state 
in Canada as “ill-defined—and difficult to 
define.”55 The most recent reference by the Su-
preme Court of Canada56 simply makes a gener-
al link between this separation and seculariza-
tion in the West—which tells us little about how 
either separation or secularization is to be con-
ceived of in Canada. In a speech comparing the 
protection of constitutional rights in the United 
States and Canada, Chief Justice McLachlin has 
said:
The United States constitution enunciates a 
doctrine of separation of church and state 
which precludes the state from supporting any 
religion. The Canadian guarantee protects the 
right of the individual to practice the religion 
of his or her choice, but also permits the state 
to support religious groups—indeed it requires 
the state to support minority Roman Catholic 
and Protestant school systems in some prov-
inces as a consequence of the concern of the fa-
thers of Confederation that minority religious 
rights be protected. 57
According to the Chief Justice, then, protection 
of freedom of religion is the Canadian parallel 
to American concepts of separation of church 
and state.
European scholar Veit Bader suggests that 
understanding separation of church and state to 
mean a complete privatization of religious belief 
and practice is a “counterfactual and maximal-
ist interpretation”58 of the phrase. He argues 
instead that only a “minimal threshold of in-
stitutional, organizational and role differentia-
tion between religious and other organizations 
(specifically the state) is functionally required 
for modern societies.”59 This threshold can best 
be described as protection of reciprocal “auton-
omies,”60 where religious organizations cannot 
control the state and the state cannot control 
the inner workings of religious organizations. 
Canadian scholar Iain T. Benson offers a simi-
lar picture: 
Though the secular overlaps with the religious, 
the secular state does not have jurisdiction 
over the religions, just as the religions, though 
they are active in the public sphere, do not 
have jurisdiction over the state.61
We would agree with Bader that “liberal-
democratic constitutions do not or should 
not require a strict wall of separation between 
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‘secular’ state politics and religions”62 and 
therefore references to the separation of church 
and state are not sufficient to preclude religious-
based reasoning by legislators. This conclusion 
is buttressed by the fact that religious references 
by politicians abound in the United States, 
which does view the separation of church and 
state as an integral constitutional principle.
Secular
Often closely allied with concepts of state neu-
trality and separation of church and state, the 
characterization of modern democratic states 
as secular is frequently the chief argument of-
fered for keeping religion out of public and po-
litical discourse. The first recorded use of the 
term “secular,” in the thirteenth century, meant 
“living in the world, not belonging to a religious 
order”; thus, a priest who lived outside a monas-
tery, attending to the needs of the world, was a 
secular priest.63 The word also had connotations 
“of an age,”64 thus allowing secularity to be con-
trasted to the eternal nature of God. A current-
day definition of secular incorporates a number 
of these elements, including “not ecclesiastical 
or clerical,” “not bound by monastic vows,” and 
“worldly or temporal”; further, the definition 
specifies “not overtly or specifically religious.”65 
There are a number of references in the ju-
risprudence to Canada as a secular state. Thus, 
in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney Gen-
eral), Lamer C.J.C., in dissent (although probably 
not on this point) stated that “the Charter has es-
tablished the essentially secular nature of Cana-
dian society.”66 The reference to the supremacy of 
God in the preamble to the Charter has not been 
recognized by courts as creating rights or pro-
viding an interpretative lens for understanding 
the rest of the Charter.67 In its most recent deci-
sion on freedom of religion, the Supreme Court 
of Canada noted that “[t]he gradual separation 
of church and state in Canada has been part of 
a broad movement to secularize public institu-
tions in the Western world.”68 However, even if 
it is generally accepted that Canada is a secular 
state, there is no one accepted definition of “secu-
lar” in Canada. Without further elaboration, this 
label gives little guidance as to exactly what role 
religion may play in public life. 
For some, the term “secular” is a synonym 
for complete separation of church and state; on 
this understanding, it means “the removal of 
religion from public life,”69 with the concomi-
tant privatization of religion as merely some-
thing one may or may not decide to engage in 
at home or in the church, synagogue, mosque, 
or temple. This approach may be based simply 
on the desire to avoid the kinds of conflict that 
can arise out of differing religious views,70 but 
more frequently it seems to reflect a view of 
religion as an unfortunate holdover from the 
past. Thus, John Von Heyking describes the 
“secularization thesis” as based on the premise 
“that societies evolve (or progress) from being 
religion-centred to being centred on secular, es-
pecially scientific knowledge, and human forms 
of governance.”71Another definition of the sec-
ularization thesis refers to “historical processes 
of rationalization that would ultimately spell 
the end of religion as a publically significant 
cultural phenomenon.”72
Even as simply a descriptive, rather than 
normative, theory, the secularization thesis 
seems doubtful. It may be somewhat credible 
in Western Europe—although even there, not 
fully—and it certainly does not seem to reflect 
experiences in North America or elsewhere. As 
Veit Bader, writing from a European perspec-
tive, states:
The thesis that religious beliefs and practices 
would inevitably decline, based on evidence in 
Western Europe, clearly does not hold for the 
US and the ‘rest of the world’. The thesis that 
all religious concerns and worries will only be 
limited to and pertain to the private realm is 
contradicted by their recent widespread pres-
ence in the public realm. Currently, conserva-
tive and fundamentalist religions as well as 
progressive religions are re-politicising ‘pri-
vate’ relations and re-normativising the eco-
nomic and political spheres.73
In Canada, according to the 2001 census (the 
most recent date for which census information 
on religious affiliation is available), one-sixth 
of Canadians reported having no religious af-
filiation.74 While one could debate exactly what 
degree of belief or practice is implied by affilia-
tion, when five-sixths of Canadians see religion 
as playing some role in their lives, it is hard to 
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argue that the secularization thesis offers an ac-
curate account of Canadian society.
Arguably, then, we should be seeking an 
understanding of secularism that more fully re-
flects the Canadian experience, and the Cana-
dian commitment to multiculturalism. Secular-
ism need not be understood solely in opposition 
to religion. Another possible definition—which 
parallels the understanding that separation of 
church and state simply requires the protection 
of reciprocal autonomies—is that a “[secular] 
state must not be run or directed by a particu-
lar religion or ‘faith-group’ but must develop a 
notion of moral citizenship consistent with the 
widest involvement of different faith groups 
(religious and non-religious).”75 This is in keep-
ing with a Canadian case that distinguished 
between a secular state and an “atheistic” one, 
describing a secular state as one that simply 
“leaves religion alone,”76 rather than, presum-
ably, one that attempts to oust it from the public 
sphere. 
In his recent work, A Secular Age,77 Canadi-
an philosopher Charles Taylor offers three un-
derstandings of the term “secular.” The first two 
possibilities are “secularized public spaces” and 
“the decline of belief or practice,” both of which 
Taylor rejects as unhelpful. Instead, he suggests 
that secularism represents 
a change . . . which takes us from a society in 
which it is virtually impossible not to believe 
in God, to one in which faith, for even the 
staunchest believer, is one human possibility 
among others. . . . Belief in God is no longer 
automatic. There are alternatives.78 
From this perspective, secularization is neither 
about the need to banish religion from public 
life, nor about the growing irrelevance of reli-
gion. Instead, it describes a state of mind alive 
to the different possibilities that exist, once one 
discards old and hegemonic assumptions.
American scholar Jeffrey Stout would agree. 
He argues that the secularization of modern de-
mocracies does not “rule[] out an expression of 
religious premises or the entitlement of individ-
uals to accept religious assumptions.”79 Instead, 
for Stout, the core aspect of this secularization 
is that speakers from within the dominant reli-
gious traditions—or indeed any religious tradi-
tion—cannot and should not assume that oth-
ers will share their perspective:
[S]ecularization concerns what can be taken 
for granted when exchanging reasons in public 
settings. . . . What makes a form of discourse 
secularized is not the tendency of the people 
participating in it to relinquish their religious 
beliefs or to refrain from employing them 
as reasons. The mark of secularization . . . is 
rather the fact that participants in a given dis-
cursive practice are not in a position to take 
for granted that their interlocutors are making 
the same religious assumptions that they are. 
This is the sense in which public discourse in 
modern democracies tends to be secularized.80
This seems to us a far more nuanced and in-
clusive understanding of the secular, to be pre-
ferred over definitions that view religion as the 
enemy of a secular state. The recognition that 
one cannot simply take for granted the perspec-
tive of others also seems to go some way towards 
answering the concerns regarding incivility and 
exclusion raised earlier.
Further, not only is this enhanced under-
standing of secular more inclusive but it is also 
more accurate. As Iain T. Benson has argued, 
it is simply inaccurate to view faith and secu-
larism as separate and opposed concepts. As we 
noted in our earlier paper on religious discourse 
in the public square, all comprehensive world 
views are based on core concepts that require 
a leap of faith. As Benson explains, “faith—un-
derstood as metaphysical assertions that we do 
not empirically prove” is “an inevitable aspect 
of human action and therefore of culture.”81 
Therefore, it is impossible to expect legislators 
to refrain from making faith-based statements. 
All politicians will make such statements from 
time to time, although some will do so from 
a religious perspective and others will call on 
other foundational values. The politician who 
speaks about the importance of fostering dig-
nity and equality for all is making a faith-based 
statement. The politician who posits that some 
species of a regulated free market provides the 
greatest scope for human flourishing is making 
a faith-based statement. This is so, even where 
there is no reference to, or reliance on, religion.
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The question, therefore, seems to be: out of 
all the different kinds of faith-based statements 
that might be made by legislators, is there a val-
id reason for excluding those that flow from a 
religious world view? Does recognition of Can-
ada as a secular state automatically require such 
a norm? While recognizing that legislation or 
government policies cannot have as their pur-
pose favouring one religion over another or 
favouring religion over nonreligion, it is hard 
to see why legislators discussing public policy 
should be allowed to make some kinds of faith-
based statements but not others. 
In Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 
36,82 the Supreme Court of Canada was required 
to interpret a provision in the British Columbia 
School Act83 to the effect that “[a]ll schools and 
Provincial schools must be conducted on strict-
ly secular and non-sectarian principles.”84 Chief 
Justice McLachlin stated:
The Act’s insistence on strict secularism does 
not mean that religious concerns have no 
place in the deliberations and decisions of the 
Board. Board members are entitled, and in-
deed required, to bring the views of the par-
ents and communities they represent to the 
deliberation process. Because religion plays 
an important role in the life of many com-
munities, these views will often be motivated 
by religious concerns. Religion is an integral 
aspect of people’s lives, and cannot be left at 
the boardroom door. What secularism does 
rule out, however, is any attempt to use the re-
ligious views of one part of the community to 
exclude from consideration the values of other 
members of the community. A requirement of 
secularism implies that, although the Board is 
indeed free to address the religious concerns 
of parents, it must be sure to do so in a man-
ner that gives equal recognition and respect to 
other members of the community.85
This approach suggests that, in Canada, secu-
larism aligns with the constitutional protection 
for freedom of religion. Or, to put it another 
way, when legislators act in accordance with s. 
2(a) of the Charter, they are exhibiting respect 
for secularism, whether their arguments for or 
against particular public policy initiatives are 
explained in religious or nonreligious terms.
Conclusion
Having looked at arguments based on ethical 
concerns for civility and inclusiveness, at con-
stitutional arguments based on freedom of re-
ligion, and at different understandings of secu-
larism and related concepts, we conclude that 
there is no good reason to frown on religious-
based references by legislators in a secular, mul-
ticultural, liberal democratic society founded 
on the rule of law. In saying this, we are not sug-
gesting that arguments based on religious be-
liefs or texts will always be good political strat-
egy, will lead to better laws, or will enhance the 
public perception of religion. However, to label 
such arguments as un-Canadian or undemo-
cratic may limit public debate, both in terms of 
the ideas that are advanced and who engages in 
the debate. Further, it would unfairly privilege 
faith-based claims founded on nonreligious 
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